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Abstract: We consider an industry where a downstream competitor requires
access to an upstream facility controlled by a vertically integrated and regulated
incumbent. The literature on access pricing assumes the access price to be exoge-
nously …xed ex-ante. We analyze an endogenous average cost based access
pricing rule, where both …rms realize the interdependence among their quantities
and the regulated access price. Endogenous access pricing neutralizes the arti…cial
cost advantage enjoyed by the incumbent …rm and results in equal or higher con-
sumer surplus. If the entrant is more e¢cient than the incumbent, then the welfare
under endogenous access pricing is also higher.
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11. Introduction
In many regulated industries, such as the telecommunications industry, down-
stream competitors require access to an upstream essential facility controlled by
a vertically integrated incumbent. Usually the essential facility is some costly in-
frastructure, such as the local loop in telecommunications or the power distribution
network in electricity. Typically, ex ante regulatory directives are used to ensure
downstream competitors’ access to the upstream facility.2 For telecommunications
in the European Union (EU), this is set forth in the Access Directive (2002) which
provides National Regulating Authorities with a set of remedies including a trans-
parency obligation (Article 9), a non-discrimination obligation (Article 10), an ac-
counting separation obligation (Article 11), an access obligation (Article 12), and
a price control and cost accounting obligation (Article 13).3 In the United States,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorizes new entrants to lease parts of the
incumbent …rm’s communications network.
To achieve the …rst best welfare outcome, the regulated access price should typ-
ically equal marginal cost of providing the infrastructure (see, for example, La¤ont
and Tirole, 1994). However, given the cost structure of most regulated sectors,
this pricing rule would not lead to full recovery of …xed costs. Hence, much of the
economic literature departs from marginal cost based pricing (see Armstrong, 2002,
for a review). For example, in the access literature, the recovery of …xed costs is
typically advocated to take place through a Ramsey markup of marginal cost.
2This is often referred to as one way access, as opposed to two way access (interconnect), where
each …rm is in a position of granting access to its rivals (e.g., both own infrastructure, or have an
installed base of customers which other …rms may desire access to). See Armstrong (2002) for an
overview.
3See European Regulatory Group. ERG, 2003.
2More common in practice, and also in the regulation of access in telecommuni-
cations, however, is an allocation based on service volume, where the access price
is based an average total cost rather than marginal cost. Fully distributed cost
(FDC), where historic common costs are allocated primarily on the basis of vol-
ume, has been widely used. Long Run Average Incremental Costs (LRAIC) is
currently being considered as an alternative. Di¤erent approaches are used to com-
pute a forward-looking access prices. However, they all compute an average cost.
In the U.S. the standard is known as TELRIC4 (see e.g. Mandy and Sharkey, 2003),
while the EU uses the term LRAIC. Thus, a transition from FDC to LRAIC may
change the common cost measure, but not the principle that the access price is
based on average costs. In practice, almost all regulatory cost allocation methods,
including FDC and LRAIC, are based on average costs, such that the access price
is set above the short-run marginal cost (La¤ont and Tirole, 2000, and Vogelsang,
2003). Thus, the average costs based access pricing rules remain popular despite
economists’ critique (see, e.g., La¤ont and Tirole, 1996, 2000) and the availability
of more sophisticated methods such as Ramsey pricing (see, e.g., La¤ont and Ti-
role, 1994 and 2000) and the e¢cient component pricing rule (see, e.g. Baumol and
Sidak, 1994, and Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers, 1996).
In general, an exogenously set average cost based access price gives rise to
con‡icts among the incumbent …rm that owns the infrastructure and the rivals
that lease the infrastructure from the incumbent. The incumbent prefers a higher,
whereas the rivals prefer a lower access price. The consequences of an exogenous
4Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost.
3access price in excess of marginal cost in an oligopolistic market have been stud-
ied by several authors. For example, Damania (1996) shows that in a homogeneous
product Cournot duopoly where only one …rm is vertically integrated, an exogenous
access price exceeding marginal cost results in the integrated …rm dominating the
market. Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) assume product di¤erentiation a la Hotelling
(1929) in a downstream duopoly setting two-part tari¤s. They show that allowing
the upstream monopolist to integrate downstream improves consumer welfare as
well as overall welfare relative to when both downstream …rms are independent.
Like in Damania (1996), the vertically integrated …rm attains a larger market share
than its rival.
To eliminate the advantage that would otherwise be enjoyed by the incumbent,
regulations often require access price to be non-discriminatory with accounting sep-
aration and transparency used to ensure “that third party access seekers are treated
no less favorably than the operator’s internal divisions" (ERG, 2003, p. 49). Such
an array of regulations (e.g, Articles 9 - 13 in the EU Access Directives), however,
gives rise to monitoring and enforcing costs, and therefore creates a signi…cant
source of welfare loss.
In this paper, we propose and analyze an endogenous average cost based
access pricing rule, where both the regulated …rm and its rivals realize the in-
terdependence among their output and the regulated access price. In contrast, the
existing literature on access pricing has always assumed the access price to be ex-
ogenously …xed ex-ante. Under an endogenous average cost based access pricing,
the access price is determined by dividing the incumbent’s …xed cost by the actual
aggregate quantities of the …rms. It seems reasonable to assume that …rms will
4realize the impact of their own output decisions on an FDC based access price, i.e.
on the share of …xed costs each …rm will end up covering.
An endogenous average cost based access price can be easily implemented in
practice. The access price determination mechanism and a tentative access price
can be announced ex-ante, with the understanding that the …rms may have to
pay more or they may receive money back ex-post according to the access price
determination mechanism. A simple option of adjusting the access price ex-post
transforms an exogenous access pricing regime to an endogenous access pricing
regime. Furthermore, under complete information, the ex-ante tentative access
price can easily be computed, such that it would be identical to the ex-post access
price, and therefore, the …rms would pay or receive nothing ex-post.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that endogenous access pricing has several advan-
tages over exogenous access pricing. We establish that: (i) Endogenous access
pricing fully neutralizes the arti…cial cost advantage otherwise enjoyed by the in-
cumbent …rm due to the wedge between the access price and the upstream marginal
cost. (ii) The aggregate quantity and the consumer surplus under endogenous ac-
cess pricing are equal to or larger than those under exogenous access pricing. (iii)
If the entrants are no less e¢cient than the incumbent, then the welfare under
endogenous access pricing is equal to or larger than the welfare under exogenous
access pricing.
Our work is distinct from, but closely related to Sappington (2005). Sappington
(2005) considers a similar framework (but with price competition, as opposed to
quantity competition downstream) and analyzes whether an entrant would build
5its own infrastructure or lease it from the incumbent. Sappington (2005) demon-
strates that the entrant’s make or buy decision is independent of the access price set
by the regulators. Our work is distinct from Sappington (2005), since we assume
that duplicating the essential infrastructure is prohibitively costly, and thus con-
centrate on designing a superior access pricing mechanism. Hence, our approach is
more appropriate for network components (e.g. the local loop) which are di¢cult
(i.e. expensive) to replicate for the rivals (see discussion by Cave and Vogelsang,
2003). On the other hand, our …ndings are similar, since they both demonstrate
redundancy of costly regulations in similar contexts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3
and 4 present the …ndings under centralized and decentralized decision making by
the incumbent …rm. Section 5 demonstrates the advantages of endogenous access
pricing, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Model
A vertically integrated incumbent …rm provides an upstream component, net-
work access, to its own downstream subsidiary and to one downstream rival. One
unit of network access is required per unit of retail service provided. The inverse
demand for downstream retail service is given by p(Q), where Q = q1 + q2 is the
sum of the incumbent and its rival’s output, q1 and q2 are the downstream quan-
tities sold by the incumbent and its rival, respectively. We assume p0(Q) < 0 and
p00(Q) · 0. Quantities and the market price are unregulated. The pro…t functions
6of the vertically integrated incumbent and its rival are, respectively:
¼1 = p(Q)q1 + wq2 ¡ c1q1 ¡ F(2.1)
¼2 = p(Q)q2 ¡ wq2 ¡ c2q2
where w is the regulated access price paid by the rival, c1 and c2 are per unit
retail costs of the incumbent owned downstream …rm and its rival. We assume
that c1 and c2 are independent of the output produced. F is total …xed cost of
providing network access. The variable cost of providing access is normalized to
zero as we wish to rule out economies of scope e¤ects for the incumbent. As we are
not interested in entry issues, we ignore downstream …xed costs.5 Furthermore, we
assume that the retail services are homogeneous. Welfare is de…ned as the sum of
the producer surplus and the consumer surplus.
The structure of the game is as follows. In Stage 1; the regulator announces the
access price or the process of determining the access price. In Stage 2, the …rms
simultaneously compete in quantities (a lá Cournot) to maximize pro…t.6
We assume that the regulator enforces an average cost based access price. Specif-
ically, the regulator is successful when the …xed network cost is covered based on
total downstream sales in equilibrium. We consider two di¤erent circumstances
(regimes) in which this objective can be achieved; an exogenous access pricing
regime and an endogenous access pricing regime.
In the exogenous access price regime, the regulator sets w = w; which is perceived
as exogenous by the …rms. w = FbQ is based on the regulator’s estimate of market
5For a thorough discussion of entry in telecommunications, see Spulber and Sidak (1997).
6Mitchell and Vogelsang (1998) argue that the rival and the integrated incumbent compete “in
capacity and pricing, so that Cournot pricing is most likely to result.”(p. 38).
7volume, bQ, which is determined by backward induction. This is unlikely to be the
optimal access price in the class of exogenous access prices as it is constrained to
equal FDC in equilibrium. Whether this occurs by "accident" or by foresight of the
regulator is not the focus here. Rather, the focus is e¤ects of the regulated …rms’
perception of whether this FDC-based access price is exogenous or endogenous.
In the endogenous access price regime, the regulator announces at Stage 1 that
w = FQ , where the access price is based on realized total output Q in the second
stage. In practice, a tentative access price can be announced ex-ante, with the
understanding that the …rms may have to pay more (or they receive money back)
ex-post according to the access price determination mechanism. Hence, w becomes
endogenous to both …rms. After the announcement of the access price determina-
tion mechanism, the …rms compete in quantities in Stage 2. The …rms’ costs and
objectives are common knowledge.
In the next sections, we analyze the outcomes under exogenous and endogenous
access pricing regimes. For each scenario, we also study the outcomes under both
centralized and decentralized decision making by the incumbent. Under the cen-
tralized decision making process, the incumbent acts as a fully integrated …rm. As
a result, the marginal cost of the upstream input (which is access) faced by the in-
cumbent owned downstream …rm is identical to the true marginal cost of access as
incurred by the upstream …rm. In contrast, under the decentralized decision mak-
ing process, the upstream …rm and the incumbent owned downstream …rm must
act as two separate …rms. As a result, the marginal cost of the upstream input
(which is access) faced by the incumbent owned downstream …rm is identical to the
marginal cost of access that is faced by its downstream rival. Note that the 2002
8EU Access Directives calls for a decentralized decision making process. Several an-
cillary obligations on accounting separation, transparency and non-discrimination
should ensure that the incumbent’s subsidiary perceives the regulated access price
as the marginal cost.
3. Centralized Decision Making by the Incumbent Firm
3.1. Exogenous Access Price. Taking access price w = w as given, both …rms
simultaneously maximize pro…t. The …rst order conditions for the incumbent and
the rival are, respectively:
p0(Q)q1 + p (Q) ¡ c1 = 0(3.1)
p0(Q)q2 + p (Q) ¡ w ¡ c2 = 0






p ¡ w ¡ c2
p0(Q)
Thus, under centralized decision making, the output and pro…t of the integrated
incumbent …rm exceed those of the rival when access price is exogenous and exceeds
the di¤erence in marginal cost between the incumbent and its rival. This con…rms
the …ndings by Damania (1996) and Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001). Furthermore,
we show that the result holds as long as the exogenous access price exceeds any
marginal cost disadvantage the incumbent might have in the retail market, that is,
w > (c1 ¡ c2). The intuition is that the access price becomes part of the rival’s
9total marginal cost, (w + c2). The incumbent enjoys an advantage as long as this
total exceeds the incumbent’s own marginal cost. The reason is that the incumbent
owned downstream …rm does not face the ‘double marginalization’ problem that is
faced by its rival. Thus, there exists an arti…cial cost advantage to the incumbent
as long as w > 0, i.e. the access price exceeds the upstream marginal cost.
Note that the regulator sets the access price at Stage 1 such that in equilibrium
in Stage 2 we get w = Fq¤1+q¤2 . Inserting w =
F
q¤1+q¤2
into the equilibrium quantities
in (3:1), and solving the following two equations, we get q¤1 ; q¤2 and w = Fq¤1+q¤2 :
p0(Q)q1 + p (Q) ¡ c1 = 0(3.3)
p0(Q)q2 + p (Q) ¡ FQ ¡ c2 = 0
Note that the equations in (3:3) result in two average cost based access price
equilibriums; one yielding a high and one yielding a low access price. The low
access price equilibrium results in higher welfare, higher pro…ts, and lower prices
and would hence be preferred by the regulator, …rms and consumers. Here and in
the rest of the paper, whenever multiple equilibria arise, we consider the equilibrium
with the lowest access price.
3.2. Endogenous Access Price. Next, we turn to the case where in Stage 1,
the regulator announces the mechanism to determine the access price. Here, the
regulator announces that the access price w will be set at Fq1+q2 : Hence, the access
price becomes endogenous to the …rms when they compete at Stage 2. Rewriting
10
the …rms’ pro…t functions in (3:1) in terms of the endogenous access price, we get:
¼1 = p(Q)q1 + w (Q) q2 ¡ c1 ¡ F(3.4)
¼2 = p(Q)q2 ¡ w (Q) q2 ¡ c2
The corresponding …rst order conditions are:
p0(Q)q1 + p (Q) + w0 (Q) q2 ¡ c1 = 0(3.5)
p0(Q)q2 + p (Q) ¡ w0 (Q) q2 ¡ w(Q) ¡ c2 = 0
Substituting for w(Q) and w0 (Q) ; and rearranging terms, we get:
p0(Q)q1 + p(Q) ¡ F
(q1 + q2)
2 (q2) ¡ c1 = 0(3.6)
p0(Q)q2 + p(Q) ¡ F
(q1 + q2)
2 (q1) ¡ c2 = 0
Proposition 1 below follows directly from equation (3:6) :
Proposition 1. Under centralized decision making and endogenous access pricing,
there will be no arti…cial cost advantage. Di¤erences in outputs between the incum-
bent owned downstream …rm and the rival are based on their respective downstream
marginal costs.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. An increase in output by one
of the …rms increases its market share and hence its share of …xed cost. Since this
e¤ect is symmetric, the incumbent …rm loses the arti…cial cost advantage it enjoyed
under exogenous access pricing. The outcome is related to Sappington (2005) in
the context of the irrelevance of input prices for make or buy access decisions by an
11
entrant. In Sappington’s model a high access price leads the vertically integrated
…rm to engage in less aggressive downstream competition. This is due to a high
opportunity cost of downstream success. In our framework there will also be an
opportunity cost of expanded output, since this will reduce the access price. How-
ever, there will be an additional e¤ect as the rival also bene…ts from increasing its
output to reduce the access price.
3.3. Comparisons of outcomes under exogenous and endogenous access
prices. We now compare the equilibrium outcomes under endogenous and exoge-
nous access pricing. Summation of the …rst order conditions in equation (3:6) yields
the following equilibrium condition when access price is considered endogenous:
(3.7) p0( eQ) eQ + 2p ³ eQ´ ¡ FeQ = c1 + c2
where eQ denotes the aggregate output under endogenous access pricing.
Similarly, substituting w = FbQ into the exogenous access pricing equilibrium
conditions in (3:1) and summing the …rst order conditions, we get:
(3.8) p0( bQ) bQ + 2p ³ bQ´ ¡ FbQ = c1 + c2
where bQ denotes the aggregate output under exogenous access pricing.
Note that equations (3:7) and (3:8) are identical, giving rise to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. With centralized decision making by the incumbent …rm, the total
quantity and the market price under endogenous access pricing are identical to those
under exogenous access pricing.
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This result is similar to a two-way access result by Economides et al. (1996). In-
vestigating the consequences of three di¤erent interconnect regulations – reciprocity
of termination charges, imputation and unbundling – they …nd that all three tend
to neutralize dominance and pro…t di¤erences in a network duopoly.
We now compare welfare under endogenous and exogenous access pricing. Since
the total quantity under endogenous access pricing are identical to that under ex-
ogenous access pricing, the welfare is larger in the scenario in which more output
is produced by the more e¢cient …rm. The following proposition follows by noting
that when the access price is exogenous, the incumbent owned downstream …rm
produces relatively more.
Proposition 3. With centralized decision making by the incumbent …rm, if c1 <
c2, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is smaller than that under
exogenous access pricing. If c1 = c2; then the welfare is identical under both access
pricing regimes. If c1 > c2; the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher
than that under exogenous access pricing.
4. Decentralized Decision Making by the Incumbent Firm
As discussed in the Introduction, the cost oriented access regulation often in-
cludes additional regulatory measures to ensure non-discrimination, such as trans-
parency and accounting separation. In this section, we assume that the vertically
integrated …rm reorganizes into upstream headquarters (HQ) providing network ac-
cess and a downstream subsidiary providing service in competition with the rival.
Simultaneously, decision making is decentralized. Based on homogeneity down-
stream, the non-discrimination obligation implies that the HQ must o¤er access on
identical terms to both downstream …rms. The downstream subsidiary maximizes
13
pro…t while treating w as its marginal cost just like the rival does. The role of
the HQ is trivial in our case as it simply passes on the access price to the down-
stream …rms. Thus, the regulator needs to ensure that the downstream unit of the
vertically integrated …rm ignores upstream pro…t when it decides the retail price.7
When decision making by the downstream …rm is decentralized, we get symmet-
rical downstream pro…t functions:
(4.1) ¼i = p(Q)qi ¡ wqi ¡ ci where i = 1; 2
4.1. Exogenous Access Price. Next, we consider the case where access price is
perceived as exogenous by the …rms. It can be veri…ed that the …rst order conditions
for pro…t maximization are:
p0(Q)q1 + p (Q) ¡ FQ ¡ c1 = 0(4.2)
p0(Q)q2 + p (Q) ¡ FQ ¡ c2 = 0
Adding the …rst order conditions in equation (4:2) ; we obtain:
(4.3) p0(Q)Q + 2p (Q) ¡ 2F
Q
¡ (c1 + c2) = 0
Next, we investigate the impact of decentralized decision making, given that
access price is perceived as exogenous by the …rms. When decision making by the
incumbent …rm is centralized, the equilibrium output are given by equation (3:1) :
7In practice, it may be di¢cult for the regulator to prevent the incumbent from using an incentive
to the downstream manager based on the overall pro…t (see Mandy, 2001, and Foros, Kind and
Sørgard, 2005). However, as will be shown below, the organizational structure does not matter
under endogenous access pricing.
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Adding the two …rst order conditions in equation (3:1) ; we obtain:
(4.4) p0(Q)Q + 2p (Q) ¡ F
Q
¡ (c1 + c2) = 0
From equations (4:3) and (4:4) ; we obtain that under exogenous access pricing,
decentralized decision making matters. Decentralized decision making leads to a
higher access price and lower quantity. Furthermore, under exogenous access pricing
and c1 · c2, then decentralized decision making by the incumbent …rm results in a
lower welfare. This supports earlier cautions about possible negative consequences
from decentralized decision making put forth by Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) and
DeGraba (2003):
4.2. Endogenous Access Price. As in the previous section, the regulator an-
nounces at Stage 1 that the access price w will be set at Fq1+q2 : Hence, the access
price becomes endogenous to the …rms when they compete in Stage 2: Therefore,
the …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization are:






¡ ci = 0(4.5)
=) p0(Q)qi + p(Q) ¡ F
(q1 + q2)
2 qj ¡ ci = 0 where i 6= j = 1; 2
Comparing equations (3:6) and (4:5), we establish that with endogenous access
pricing, outcomes under decentralized decision making are identical to those under
centralized decision making.
Proposition 4. With endogenous access pricing, individual …rm quantities, total
output, market price and welfare under decentralized decision making are identical
to those under centralized decision making.
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Put di¤erently, under endogenous access pricing, the organizational structure of
the incumbent does not matter. The intuition is that the symmetry in how …xed
network costs are allocated is una¤ected by the vertical structure of the incumbent.
When vertically separated, the HQ’s role is insigni…cant since the access price w
will be set at Fq1+q2 and the downstream subsidiary will act accordingly. Nothing
changes when the incumbent is integrated. Due to this insigni…cance of vertical
structure, summing the …rst order conditions in (4:5) simply reproduces (3:7).
4.3. Comparisons of outcomes under exogenous and endogenous access
prices. Given decentralized decision making, a comparison of outcomes under ex-
ogenous and endogenous access prices requires a comparison between equations
(4:3) and (3:7). which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5. With decentralized decision making by the incumbent …rm, (i)
the total quantity under endogenous access pricing is higher than under exogenous
access pricing, and furthermore (ii) if c2 · c1, welfare is also higher.
What begs a question is then, why do we not observe endogenous access pricing
rules in practice? Our claim is that such rules should be quite easy to implement
through some end of the year rebates contingent on the realized volumes. In unregu-
lated markets, e.g. the grocery industry, we observe that di¤erent types of buy-back
clauses are used, such that the input price depends on the realized volumes ex post.
However, if one of the …rms fears that the other part will go bankrupt, or for other
reason may not ful…l the agreement, such contracts will loose their appeal. This
may be a main reason why we have not observed such contract on access pricing. In
particular, the access providers have been sceptical. One reason is that their pro…t
is higher, other things equal, under exogenous average cost based access pricing due
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to the arti…cial cost advantage. Furthermore, they fear that this may be a one-way
compensation, such that the regulated …rm has to pay compensation when volumes
ex post are higher than estimated. The access provider will not be able to obtain
end of the year compensation if the volumes is below what was estimated. There-
fore, active involvements of the appropriate and relevant authorities are needed to
implement endogenous access pricing. Proper access pricing guidelines, backed by
appropriate authorities, should lessen the access provider’s concerns.
5. Advantages of Endogenous Access Pricing
In this section, we present the advantages of endogenous access pricing. As
stated in Proposition (1), endogenous access pricing neutralizes the advantage en-
joyed by an incumbent …rm making centralized decisions. With endogenous access
pricing, the market shares and the pro…ts of the …rms are identical. Therefore, with
endogenous access pricing, the regulators do not need to worry about enforcing a
non-discrimination obligation and an accounting separation obligation, as stated in
Articles 10 and 11 of 2002 European Union Access Directives. Also, Propositions
(2) and (5) state that the aggregate quantity under endogenous access pricing is at
least as large as the aggregate quantity under exogenous access pricing. Hence, the
consumer surplus is equal or higher under endogenous access pricing. Furthermore,
from Propositions (3) and (5), it follows that if c2 · c1, then the welfare under
endogenous access pricing is at least as large as the welfare under exogenous access
pricing. Di¤usion of technology and/or higher likelihood of adaptation of superior
technology by the later entrant justify the condition c2 · c1:
Proposition (6) below summarizes the above discussions and highlights the ad-
vantages of an endogenous access pricing:
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Proposition 6. Irrespective of centralized or decentralized decision making by the
incumbent …rm, (i) the aggregate quantity and the consumer surplus under endoge-
nous access pricing are equal to or larger than those under exogenous access pricing.
(ii) endogenous access pricing neutralizes the arti…cial advantage that is otherwise
enjoyed by the incumbent …rm, (iii) if c2 · c1, then the welfare under endogenous
access pricing is equal to or larger than the welfare under exogenous access pricing.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose and analyze an endogenous average cost based
access pricing rule. The existing literature on access pricing has always used
exogenous access pricing, where the access price is …xed ex-ante. Despite the pres-
ence of more sophisticated rules such as Ramsey pricing or the E¢cient Component
Pricing Rule (ECPR), the average cost based rules dominate in practice. Fully dis-
tributed cost (FDC) based exogenous access pricing has been commonly used in
the telecommunications industry. Long run average incremental cost (LRAIC) is
now being considered as an alternative. However, both result in an access price
based on some ex ante average cost.
We argue that an endogenous access pricing rule can be easily implemented
in practice. A simple option of adjusting the access price ex-post transforms an
exogenous access pricing regime to an endogenous access pricing regime. A tentative
access price can be announced ex-ante, with the understanding that a …rm may
have to pay more (or it may receives money back) ex-post according to the access
price determination mechanism. Under complete information, a tentative access
price can easily be computed ex-ante, such that it would be identical to the ex-post
access price, and therefore, the …rms would pay or receive nothing ex-post.
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We demonstrate that an endogenous access pricing has signi…cant advantages
over an exogenous access pricing: (i) the aggregate quantity and the consumer
surplus under endogenous access pricing are equal to or larger than those under ex-
ogenous access pricing. (ii) endogenous access pricing neutralizes the arti…cial cost
advantage that is otherwise enjoyed by the incumbent …rm. (iii) if the entrant is as
e¢cient as the incumbent …rm, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is
equal to or larger than the welfare under exogenous access pricing. Furthermore, we
show that costly ancillary obligations, such as accounting separation, transparency,
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